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Abstract
Stock Price Crash Risk (SPCR) is the risk of stock price collapse. SPCR conditions must
be understood by stakeholders, among others: for regulators in order to avoid the
devastation of stock prices that have systemic impact on the capital market; for
suppliers to sell their products to the company; for company employees to maintain
the sustainability of the company so that they can still work; for shareholders to
keep the stock of the company from the risk of delisting in the capital market; to the
prospective investor as the basis of investment decision in the capital market; and
to the Investment Manager in order to master the stock portfolio risk knowledge in
the capital market. We examine the relation among implementation of sustainability
reporting strategy (SRS) impact on SPCR with sustainability reporting quality (SRQ) as
variable intervening. Using signaling theory, we find that a good company will provide
signal hints for stakeholders regarding SRS that have a significant effect on the SRQ.
This provides legitimacy for the company by gaining stakeholders’ confidence to buy
its stocks (shares) so as to minimize SPCR.
Keywords: Signaling theory, stock price crash risk (SPCR), sustainability reporting
strategy (SRS), sustainability reporting quality (SRQ)
1. Introduction
The main predictor of SPCR is the tendency of management to hold and stockpile its
bad news from investors. Controlling the specific determinants of stock price crash
risk indicates that the disclosure of non-accounting information about the company as
outlined in the sustainability report tends to have the ability to reduce SPCR. Disclosure
of information signals between management and stakeholders through SRS and the
role of mediation SRQ, can be used as a reference in decision-making. A sustainability
report immediately publicized by the company will have an impact on increasing stock
prices.
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Cho et al. (2012) argue that managers as agents cover non-accounting information
in the form of bad news from investors, as well as principals to maintain careers and
compensation managers concerned. When bad news accumulates, so the accumula-
tion of all bad news out and lead to the SPCR. Fraker (2006), Kim & Zhang (2010)
supported the previous study, demonstrating the disclosure of SRS reducing those risks
( James 2013). The incidence of stock price crashes on the Indonesia Stock Exchange,
that is, the collapse of the stock price of TAXI in 2015 which is more than 90%, thus
destroying the portfolio of investors who invest money in this stock. The decline in
TAXI’s stock price is due to a managerial tendency to cover up the bad news that TAXI
cannot pay interest on its loans and bonds due to the impact of a SRS. Fernandez (2013)
stated that SRS improvement cannot minimize SPCR. Utama (2013) conveys the need
for appropriate strategies to improve the transparency of non-accounting information,
so investors can capture good information signals from the company. Kim et al. (2014)
states that all SRS that demonstrate environmental and social concerns are contained
in the SRQ. This is a testament to the behavior of the responsible management/board
of director. Bonheure & Ramos (2009) and Rashid et al. (2015) supporting SRS may
impact on the SRQ.
Firms with legitimacy and good reputation are usually supported by SRS that have
a significant effect on SRQ (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). These companies will get a positive
image in the eyes of local investors and global investors associated with stock prices
that have a lower risk of SPCR (Utama, 2013). According to Michelon & Parbonetti
(2012) a positive image in the investor’s view is the result of positive signals that
the company can increase its share price thus encouraging the company to behave
in a responsible manner. This is according to Beck et al. (2010) is in accordance with
the sustainability agenda and strengthened by Burritt & Schaltegger (2010) which
states the influence of the signaling theory underlies the existence of sustainability
reports. Wong & Millington (2014) argues that the company is firmly committed to
implementing sustainable business practices as a positive corporate identity, thereby
creating a new paradigm for sustainability (Lin et al., 2012).
The new paradigm for sustainability is closely linked to the non-accounting infor-
mation quality set forth by the board of directors in SRS. Good and transparent SRS
affect SRQ, but SRS cannot minimize SPCR (Burritt & Schaltegger 2010). Investors as
stakeholders begin to pay attention to social and environmental issues, so that the
use of other non-accounting information is used as a basis for decision-making. Garcia
et al. (2013) argues that investors are increasingly believing to use the SRQ information
as a basis for the decision to buy the company’s shares. In contrast, Amran et al.
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(2013) suggests that SRS has no significant effect on SPCR. This provides the basis
for conducting research proving that the SRQ can be used as an intervening variable
against SPCR.
SRQ disclosures has the ability tominimize SPCR (Nur et al., 2013). Based on signaling
theory, Li et al. (2016) serve as the basis for examining the SRQ as an intervening vari-
able against SPCR. The implementation of SRQ is very important and gets the attention
of all stakeholders (Chauvey et al., 2014), especially investors and risk managers who
learn a lot from accounting cases and scandals as a result of poor SRQ. Amran et al.
(2014) proves that the SRQ is important in the framework of the company’s strategy
to maintain its stock price from SPCR.
In contrast, Reimsbach et al. (2017) stated that the SRQ is not important in influencing
SPCR. Research on the impact of SRS on SPCRmediated by SRQ, as far as the researcher
has not done much. Another reason is the results of previous research by Reimsbach
et al. (2017) inconsistency with the results of Amran et al. (2013), so researchers need
to add SRQ as intervening variable to SPCR.
Al-Shaer & Zaman (2016) proves that SRS does not relate to the proportion / number
of women as members of the board of directors on the SRQ. The results of this study
have differences with Amran et al. (2014) which states that SRS relating to the number
/ proportion of women as directors compared to the total number of directors affects
the SRQ.
Based on the background of inconsistency of research result and addition of variable
of SRQ as intervening variable, hence formulation of problem in this research is as
follows: (i) Does SRS affect SPCR? (ii) Does SRS affect SRQ? (iii) Does SRS affect SPCR
mediated by SRQ?
This research is expected to give practical contribution for investor and go public’s
company in Indonesia Stock Exchange that is: (i) For Investor: The results of this study
are expected to confirm investors’ perceptions of the SRS presented by the Board of
Directors and SRQ’s disclosure in improving information reliability. This study can also
provide added value and show the investor response to SRQ of the company. This will
influence investors to evaluate their portfolio based on their corporate social, economic
and environmental responsibility activities and the level of disclosure they have made,
to serve as a basis for decision-making for investors in investing. (II) For Company:
The results of this study can provide an overview for the company about the impact
of SRS and SRQ’s disclosure against SPCR. This becomes the basis for risk managers
to take into account in order to maintain the company’s stock price against SPCR. This
research is also expected to encourage companies to evaluate risk management and
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improve SRQ so as tominimize the occurrence of SPCR. This researchwill also show the
market response to the profit of the company and SRQ’s disclosure. This will encourage
companies to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of reporting practices as well
as SRQ’s disclosure within the company. (iii) For Policy Contributions: This research
is expected to provide empirical evidence on SRS in improving the reliability, trans-
parency and SRQ. This can serve as a basis for evaluating mandatory rules related
to sustainability reporting. The results of this study are also useful for the Financial
Services Authority (OJK) on sustainability reporting reports that are mandatory, so it
can be used as evaluation and basic improvement on the quality of SRQ as a form of
corporate social responsibility (CSR).
2. Conceptual Framework from Theory to Practice
The signaling theory is a behavior of corporate management in giving directions to
investors, related to management strategies and views on future prospects (Brigham
& Houston, 2011). Disclosure of signaling theory is in the form of information (signals)
of success or failure of a given company. The signaling theory also states that a good
quality company will deliberately signal to the market, so the market is expected
to differentiate good and bad quality companies. In order for the signal to be good
then it should be captured and perceived good market and not easily imitated by
companies that have poor quality. A good signal can be captured by the market and
not easily imitated by poor quality companies is a signaling theory implementation
that underlies the practice of income smoothing, one form of earnings management.
This theory deals with asymmetric information that can occur if one party has a more
complete information signal than the other party. Accounting figures reported by the
management can be used as a signal, if the numbers can reflect information about the
attributes of company decisions that are not monitored. In addition to financial state-
ment information that sometimes shows the results of profit manipulation, investors
also consider sustainability reports as a reliable information signal (Kim et al., 2014).
Disclosure of these signals indicates an attempt to minimize the asymmetric informa-
tion that occurs between management and the stakeholders in the form of SRQ.
Disclosure of information signals between management and stakeholders
expressed in the form of sustainability reporting practices is differentiated by its
nature. Anthony&Govindarajan (2014) states there are two types of disclosure proper-
ties: voluntary disclosure andmandatory disclosure. Voluntary disclosure is a corporate
disclosure beyond what is required / regulated. Instead, mandatory disclosure is the
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standard setter’s disclosure to management in making financial reporting. The Com-
pany voluntarily discloses important information in the form of quality sustainability
reports (SRQ) to stakeholders to be a reference in decision-making. The theory under-
lying voluntary disclosure is the signaling theory. This theory illustrates the actions
preferred by high-type managers rather than low-level managers. Management
always tries to disclose private information which according to its consideration is
very interested by potential investors and shareholders especially if the information is
good news (good news). In addition, management is keen to convey information that
can improve its credibility and company success, even though such information is not
required (Kim, 2014). Unnecessary information can improve the credibility and success
of the company will still be delivered by management. Based on the signaling theory,
it also reveals that the company gives a signal in the form of information on activities
that have been done by management (Chauvey et al., 2014) to realize the interests
of the owners that is to maximize their profits. Thus, the longer the duration of the
publication of the sustainability report (SR), causing unstable stock pricemovement, so
investors interpret it as a delay condition. This condition occurs because the company
does not immediately publish SR and annual report (annual report), which then affects
the decline in stock prices of its company.
The SR that will be publicly published by the company will have an impact on the
increase of stock price. The SR is a voluntary disclosure done by the company to help
investors better understand the strategies used by the company’smanagement (Dhali-
wal et al., 2011). Voluntary disclosure will be more done by the company if the quality
of information owned by themanager of the company is relatively high. Companies are
increasingly expanding their voluntary disclosure of SR as they seek to attract public
and investor attention (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). With a broader voluntary disclosure, the
company will be more concerned by investors, thereby reducing asymmetric informa-
tion and reducing the firm’s capital costs, which will ultimately reduce the stock price
crash risk estimates. In making voluntary disclosures, management considers the costs
and benefits derived from those disclosures. If the benefits gained are greater than the
costs incurred, the management will disclose the information voluntarily. Low capital
costs are the main benefits felt by management in disclosing the information made for
decision-making. Many studies have proven that voluntary disclosure of reports will
help control conflicts of interest among shareholders, debtholders, and management
(Brigham & Houston, 2011); (Andreou, et al., 2016); Anthony & Govindarajan (2014).
According to Brigham & Houston (2011) the signaling theory has three advantages:
(i) can reveal the information needed by investors to distinguish between high-value
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firms and low-value firms by observing the ownership of their capital structure, and
marking high valuations for firms which has a high value/highly leveled. Equilibrium is
stable because low-value companies cannot emulate higher-value firms; (ii) Another
advantage of signaling theory is its ability to explain the occurrence of rising stock
prices in response to increased financial leverage; (iii) Another advantage is that sig-
naling theory is needed to reduce the effect of information asymmetry (asymmetric
information).
Anthony & Govindarajan (2014)mentions 2weaknesses of signaling theory, namely:
(i) inability to explain the reverse relationship between profitability and leverage; (ii)
Cannot explain why firms with high growth potential and intangible asset value should
use more debt than high non-tangible assets companies.
Several previous studies have attempted to forecast the risk of SPCR specifically
for companies (Burhan, 2012; Rashid et al., 2015). Firth et al. (2006) stated that the
distribution of stock returns showed a tendency of negative asymmetry. One of the
main predictor factors of the risk of SPCR is the managerial tendency to cover up the
bad news of the company from investors (Fernandez, 2013). Cho, et al. (2012) argue
that managers (agents) cover and retain bad news from investors and principals, aim
to maintain the career and compensation of the manager concerned. When bad news
accumulates and reaches a critical point, the accumulation of all bad news comes out
and leads to SPCR. Kim et al. (2014) states that SRQ and responsible behavior realities of
directors in financial reporting (Bonheure and Ramos 2009) indicate a lack of evidence
of earnings management (Rashid et al., 2015). This is stated by the firm’s commitment
to higher ethical standards having a positive impact on the quality of accounting infor-
mation. The same results by Kim et al. (2011) found that companies that do Corporate
Social Responsibilities (CSR) provide financial disclosures more consistent with cor-
porate strategy ideas (Bebbington et al. (2012) which considers increased disclosure
of SRQ as socially responsible behaviors (Cho, Michelon et al., 2012) in the overall
implementation of SR. Disclosure of the SRQ is a form of corporate responsibility with
a better CSR culture (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012). This condition is
able to withstand high ethical standards in SR. Companies tend to be more transparent
(Chen and Roberts 2010), so as to obscure bad news from investors. Thereby expected
to improve the reputation of these companies, which ultimately make the investors
buy their shares, then the stock price rises. This condition is related to stock price
which has lower risk to SPCR (Utama, 2013). An increase in stock prices and minimal
SPCR increases the complexity of the company’s business (Michelon and Parbonetti
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2012). This condition is coupled with a global transformation that encourages compa-
nies to behave more responsibly and push the sustainability agenda. Sustainability is
generally defined in the context of sustainable development. The Company is firmly
committed to implementing sustainable business practices in corporate identity (Wong
and Millington 2014), thus creating a new paradigm for sustainability.
This is evidenced by the benefits of disclosure of information and the facilities for
decision-making facilities, so that companies can strengthen its legitimacy. Disclosure
of information disclosure has several benefits. Herbohn et al., (2014) shares the bene-
fits of quality disclosure in SR by profit-making enterprises based on three categories
of interest: (i) corporate interests, (ii) non-owner interests, and (iii) national interests.
Therefore, the SRQ is seen as a way to influence perceptions of a company’s financial
outlook in the view of external stakeholders, especially financial stakeholders (stock
analysts, capital markets, and institutional investors). This proves that although a qual-
ified SR report is a voluntary report and the report is unaudited, it has the credibility
that the financial stakeholders take into account for decision-making.
Andreou et al. (2016) corroborates the study of Herbohn et al. (2014) stating that
accounting information should be able to make a decision. If it does not affect the
decision, the information is said to be irrelevant to the decision taken. There is currently
a tendency for increased dissatisfaction with traditional financial reporting and its
ability to provide sufficient information about the company’s ability to create wealth
for stakeholders. This happens because of the decline in the quality of the value of
information submitted financial statements. Financial information, such as profit, book
value, and cash flow are highly irrelevant in stock price crash risk (Reimsbach et al.,
2017). In contrast, non-financial indicators and information in the SR report have a
high degree of relevance in the assessment of stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2014).
Amran et al. (2014) conducted based on a cross-sectional study of 113 companies in 12
countries in the Asia Pacific region shows evidence that there is no relationship and
no influence between the diversity / gender diversity of the board of directors with
the quality of the SR report. Research conducted by Fernandez (2013) and Al-Shaer
& Zaman (2016) conducted at different countries locations, shows that the board of
directors with more quantities / quantities of women, will reveal more complete SRQ
information. Board of directors with the number of three or more women will further
improve the SRQ. This is evidenced by the disclosure of more complete information,
including assurance reports that provide credibility for SR. It is argued that the presence
of female directors also mediates the production of moderate SRQ on SRS. This shows
the results of inconsistent research, thus providing opportunities for further research.
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3. Conclusion
The impact of the disclosure of SRS by providing more complete information signals is
carried out by the company through proactive communication strategies such as those
communicated through press (media activities). The benefit of the company sharing
relevant information in the SR to outsiders is to derive the asymmetry information that
occurs on the company with its stakeholders.
The disclosure of general information affecting the SRQ and the impact of the com-
pany’s activities, so this approach can be useful for knowing the SR report with an
insight into the organization’s underlying commitments, thus demonstrating a commit-
ted approach. The more qualified SRQ, the more SR disclosure information in its annual
report, thereby reducing the public’s spotlight on the company. Conversely, companies
that have managers (board of directors) who like to hoard bad news, it can increase
the SPCR. Under a weak monitoring environment, charitable /philanthropic activities
can be useful to play a greater role in increasing transparency and beneficial to lower
SPCR.
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